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Behavioural Consequences of Obligations  
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"...FOR  LEGISLATORS  MAKE  THE  CITIZENS  GOOD  BY  FORMING  HABITS  IN  THEM,  AND  THIS  IS  THE  WISH  FOR  EVERY 
LEGISLATOR,  AND  THOSE  WHO  DO  NOT  EFFECT  IT  MISS  THEIR  MARK,  AND  IT  IS  IN  THIS  THAT  A  GOOD  CONSTITUTION 




How  formal  institutions  (e.g.  laws  and  public  policies)  affect  human 
behaviour represents a crucial issue in economic analysis. Formal rules 
are defined as obligations backed by incentives. The economic literature 
has largely studied the role of material incentives in shaping individual 
behaviour. Yet, the role of obligations, i.e. what formal rules ask people 
to do or not to do, remains a black box. In this paper we run a public 
good game to analyze the behavioural effects of obligations. We find 
experimental evidence that obligations can affect cooperative behaviour 
both  by  coordinating  conditional  co-operators’  beliefs  on  others’ 
behaviour and by directly affecting social preferences. Our results shed a 
new light on the behavioural channels through which formal rules can 
affect individual behaviour and suggest the opportunity to broaden the 
scope of analysis in order to better understand the effects of institutions 
on economic outcomes. 
 
Keywords:  Beliefs,  Human  Behaviour,  Incentives,  Obligations, 
Preferences, Public Good Game. 
JEL Classification: C91, C92, H26, H41, K40. 
 
 
                                                 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:  We  wish  to  thank  Sam  Bowles,  Ernst  Fehr  and  Jan  Potters  for  extremely  useful 
discussions, suggestions and encouragement about this project. We benefited from the comments by Simon Gaechter, 
Theo  Offermann,  Urs  Fischbacher,  Michele  Bernasconi, Michael  Kosfeld,  Christian  Zehnder  and  participants  in 
seminars at Amsterdam (UVA), Bologna, European University Institute, Toronto and Zuerich (IEW). We are grateful 
to Francesco Lomagistro for his excellent assistance in the lab. We gratefully acknowledge the University of Siena 
for financial support. All the usual disclaimers apply.  
 
♣  Roberto  Galbiati  (Corresponding  author),  Department  of  Economics  and  Max  Weber  Program,  European 
University Institute. E-mail: roberto.galbiati@IUE.it 




   2 
1. Introduction 
When authorities (e.g. legislators, managers, parents,…) want to influence people’s behaviour 
(e.g. citizens, employees, children), they set rules of conduct. They ask people to do or not to 
do something and try to induce compliance by setting incentives in the form of rewards and/or 
sanctions. Economic theory provides powerful tools to predict the effects of incentives through 
the analysis of their impact on individuals’ material payoffs. Furthermore, recent developments 
in  behavioural  economics  provide  new  and  powerful  models  of  human  motivation  able  to 
explain some psychological effects of incentives that cannot be fully understood through the 
lens of material costs and benefits (e.g. Benabou and Tirole, 2003 and forthcoming; Bowles, 
2006; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, forthcoming and Frey, 
1997)
 1. Yet, despite studying the effects of incentives is a necessary condition in order to fully 
understand  the  behavioural  consequences  of  formal  rules,  sometimes  this  might  not  be 
sufficient. Indeed, incentives are only one side of the coin of a formal rule, the other side being 
represented by the obligations set up by the rule itself. According to an established Anglo-
American legal tradition – the imperative theory of law - formal rules (e.g. laws) are well 
defined as “obligations backed by sanctions”
2. A formal rule is typically a statement such as: 
“you ought to… or else you will pay…” (or “you ought to… and you then will get…”). In this 
sentence, incentives are captured by the “or else…” part, while obligations by the “you ought 
to…” component.  
In this paper we aim at understanding whether or not obligations exert any independent effect 
on people’s behaviour and through which behavioural channels these possible effects come into 
play. According to the traditional view of human motivation, obligations per se do not have any 
independent effect on behaviour because they do not influence material payoffs. However, if 
we recognize that people’s behaviour is driven by diverse motives than self-interest (e.g. social 
preferences), obligations may entail some behavioural consequences. Exploring this possibility 
is the main aim of this research. In order to understand and predict the behavioural effects of 
formal rules, we explore their effects on the reasons of behaviour, that is to say on people’s 
beliefs and preferences. Beliefs consist in what people think others will do; preferences are a 
complex set of motives accounting for individual actions (Bowles, 1998): tastes, values, the 
way in which a situation is framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), self-perception, emotions, 
psychological dispositions. Methodologically, we investigate whether or not what formal rules 
ask people to do (i.e. obligations) exert any independent effect on individuals’ beliefs and 
preferences  (and  consequently  on  individuals’  behaviour)  by  designing  and  running  an 
experiment able to isolate the effects of obligations from those of marginal incentives backing 
them.  
                                                 
 
2 See Cooter (2000) and Raz (1980).   3 
We carry out our experimental investigation in a public good setting. This choice is motivated 
by  the fact that formal  rules,  and  in  particular legal  rules, are  often  set  by  legislators  and 
governments  with  the  specific  objective  to  overcome  social  dilemmas  (e.g.  free  riding  in 
income tax compliance, common pool resources management, traffic behaviour, environmental 
regulation) in order to align private incentives to common good. Our experimental design is 
based  on  a  one  shot  linear  public  good  game  with  the  peculiarity  that  subjects  face  an 
exogenous obligation of minimum contribution: “a minimum contribution of X tokens to the 
public good is required to each individual”. This obligation is highlighted and enforced by a 
structure of incentives
3: an individual contributing less (more) than the minimum contribution 
is subject to a probabilistic penalty (reward). In this setting, in order to isolate the behavioural 
effects  of  obligations,  we  let  vary  the  level  of  minimum  contribution  required  across  the 
different treatments, while we leave unaltered the structure of marginal incentives. Obligations 
may reasonably affect cooperative behaviour trough two mechanisms. First, as long as some 
individuals are conditional co-operators, i.e. they are willing to cooperate if the others in their 
group  contribute  to  a  sufficient  extent,  obligations  may  act  as  coordination  devices  which 
channel individuals’ beliefs about others' behaviours to a common focal point, thus shaping 
cooperative behaviour. Second, obligations may entail some direct psychological effects on 
social preferences (and thus on behaviour) as long as the message conveyed by the obligation 
may urge people to update their personal norms of contributions. 
Eliciting unconditional contributions allows for testing whether or not obligations have any 
behavioural effect. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to understand the behavioural channels of 
such a possible effect (if through beliefs about others’ contributions, social preferences or both 
of them). In order to single out the effects of obligations on beliefs about others’ behaviour from 
possible  effects  on  social  preferences,  after  the  first  stage  of  the  experiment  based  on 
unconditional contributions to the public good game, we ask to each subject her beliefs about 
others’  average  unconditional  contributions.  Moreover,  we  elicit  individual  conditional 
contributions:  we  ask  people  to  decide  how  much  they  want  to  contribute  for  different 
hypothetical average contributions in the group. By comparing the conditional contributions 
schedules  emerging  in  the  different  treatments,  we  are  able  to  determine  whether  or  not 
obligations have any direct effects on social preferences.  
We find that obligations exert a clean and significant effect on unconditional contributions to 
the public good, thus supporting the idea that obligations have an independent role in driving 
individuals’ behaviour
4. This result can be explained by resorting to the fact, common in public 
goods experiments, that a share of people acts as conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al. 
                                                 
3  We  introduce  a  structure  of  incentives  enforcing  the  minimum  contribution  in  order  to  reflect  the 
standard view that both obligations and incentives are necessary components to define formal rules: a rule 
represents an obligation and not simply a suggestion only if the individual behaviour with respect to this 
rule is subject to some consequences in terms of sanctions/rewards. 
4 These findings are in line with those obtained by Galbiati and Vertova (2005) in a dynamic setting.   4 
2001),  i.e.  they  are  willing  to  contribute  to  the  public  good  if  the  others  contribute  to  a 
sufficient  extent:  by  affecting  expectations  about  others’  contributions,  obligations  drive 
individual  contributions.  Through  the  elicitation  of  beliefs  about  others’  contributions,  we 
corroborate this hypothesis. But is this all or do obligations also affect individual preferences 
for cooperation? The second part of the experiment helps to answer this question. We find that 
conditional contribution schedules are in average significantly different across the treatments. 
As conditional contributions represent what people decide to contribute given any possible 
level  of  others’  contributions,  this  finding  supports  the  idea  that  obligations  are  able  to 
influence people’s behaviours also by directly affecting their social preferences. 
In the last decade an extensive experimental and empirical literature focused on the unexpected 
effects of explicit incentives on people’s behaviour. Our investigation adds to this stream of 
literature by showing that in order to fully understand the effects of formal rules we should 
carefully consider the possible behavioural effects of an apparently negligible element: the 
contents of rules as expressed by obligations
5. Furthermore, very little is known about the 
motivational channels through which formal rules exert their (unexpected) consequences; our 
investigation contribute to fill this gap by providing clean experimental evidence about the 
ways formal rules are able to affect individual behaviour: we show that obligations are able to 
influence  people’s  behaviour  by  both  shaping  their  beliefs  and  directly  influencing  social 
preferences. These findings support the idea that laws have an expressive power: they affect 
people behaviour not only by shaping the material payoffs, of but also by directly influencing 
people’s motives for behaviour (Cooter, 2000). More in general, this contribution relates to the 
study of formal institutions (e.g. North, 1990) by suggesting the opportunity to broaden the 
scope of the analysis in order to understand the effects of institutions on economic outcomes. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  reports  the  experimental  design  and  the 
behavioural predictions. Section 3 describes and comments the results. Section 4 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Experiment 
In this section we describe the experimental design. The aim of this experiment is to understand 
whether or not obligations have any behavioural effects independently from those of marginal 
incentives backing them. To pursue this objective, we try to answer the following questions: a) 
do obligations affect cooperative behaviour? b) if obligations affect behaviour, how do they act? 
By affecting beliefs about others’ behaviour, by affecting preferences for cooperation or both of 
them? In the first subsection we outline the experimental game. In the second we describe the 
experimental treatments, procedures and parameters. Finally we report behavioural predictions.  
                                                 
5 It is worth remarking that our results are in line with the experimental findings on the behavioural 
effects of minimum wage obtained by Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (forthcoming).   5 
 
2.1. The experimental game 
The  experiment  consists  of  a  one  shot  linear  public  good  game  followed  by  a  conditional 
contribution stage. Overall, we ask participants to make two choices. The first is a choice of 
‘unconditional contribution’: subjects are asked to make their contributions to the public good 
game. After all subjects have chosen their unconditional contribution, we ask participants to 
make the choices of ‘conditional contribution’, that is to say to select how much to contribute to 
the  public  good  in  correspondence  of  different  average  contributions  of  the  other  group 
members.
6 
The  linear  public  good  game  we  implement  differs  from  a  standard  voluntary  contribution 
mechanism  as  we  fix  exogenously  an  obligation  of  minimum  contribution.  This  obligation 
indicates a minimum level of contribution that each subject is required to provide for the public 
good. This obligation is enforced by a structure of incentives: in particular there is a probability 
of control and a probabilistic penalty (reward) for individuals whose contributions are lower 
(higher) than the level of minimum contribution required
7. As we are interested in the effects of 
obligations per se, we keep as fixed across all treatments the level of marginal incentives, i.e. 
the probability to be audited and the penalty/reward rate. On the contrary, the level of the 
minimum contribution required by obligation changes across the treatments. The incentives are 
fixed at a very low level. This choice is due to two reasons: firstly, we aim at testing whether or 
not an obligation of minimum contribution affects cooperation when incentives are such that the 
optimal strategy for self-interested individuals is the full free-riding even if they are risk adverse 
within  reasonable  degrees.  Secondly,  we  want  to  minimize  the  possible  bias  in  our  results 
caused by differences in risk preferences across samples.  
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,  p  is the probability of audit,  g  is the penalty/reward rate. We set the 
parameters such that the following inequalities hold:  n m / 1 >  and  1 < + pg m .  
In  order  to  understand  whether  the  possible  effect  of  obligations  on  cooperation  should  be 
imputed to an influence on preferences, on beliefs or on both of them, we need to understand: a) 
if  individuals  beliefs  about  others’  contributions  are  significantly  different  in  the  different 
                                                 
6 We apply here a modified version of the strategy method (see Selten, 1967). 
7 The penalty (reward) is proportional to the negative (positive) difference between the actual contribution 
and the minimum contribution required.   6 
treatments; b) if, given others’ hypothetical contributions, individuals’ conditional behaviour 
significantly varies in the different treatments. In order to pursue the latter task, we elicit people 
conditional contributions by applying a variant of the so-called “strategy method” (Selten, 1967) 
as developed in the experimental design by Fischbacher et al. (2001). After the unconditional 
contribution stage, subjects are asked to report their conditional contributions. In particular, 
each subject has to fill in a conditional contribution table: for each possible level of average 
contribution in the group, and given the level of minimum obligation, she has to declare how 
much she wants to contribute to the public good. To give subjects the material incentives to take 
their  conditional  contribution  decisions  seriously,  we  adhere  to  the  procedure  designed  by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects are told that, after they have taken both decisions, a random 
mechanism would select which one of the two decisions becomes effective in determining their 
payoffs.  In  each  group,  one  subject  is  randomly  selected.  For  this  subject  the  conditional 
contribution table determines her actual contribution to the public good, whereas for the other 
group members the relevant decision is the unconditional contribution. This mechanism ensures 
that all entries in the conditional contribution table are potentially relevant in determining the 
payoffs of each subject. The procedure described above is equivalent to the following game: 
first,  nature  selects  n-1  players  who  make  their  unconditional  contribution  decisions 
simultaneously given the payoff structure described above. The n-th player learns the average 
contribution of the other players and takes her contribution decision. Each player knows if she is 
the n-th player and, in case she is not, she does not know who this player is.  
After all players have decided how much to contribute to the public good, the control stage 
takes place: a player’s contribution may be randomly controlled (with probability p) and the 
player  may  get  a  monetary  reward  (sanction)  if  she  has  contributed  more  (less)  than  the 
minimum contribution required by obligation. 
Finally,  in  order  to  have  a  proxy  of  people’s  beliefs  about  others’  contributions,  in  each 
treatment  we  ask  each  subject  what she  expects  others  have  contributed  on average  in  the 
unconditional contribution decision. In order to give the incentive to take this decision seriously, 
those who actually make the right prediction gain an adjunctive monetary payment. 
 
2.2. Treatments, parameters and procedures. 
We  implement  three  different  experimental  treatments  for  the  minimum  contribution:  a  ‘0 
condition’,  where  no  minimum  contribution  is  required  by  obligation,  a  ‘low  obligation 
condition’ (‘L condition’) where subjects are required to contribute at least a fraction of 1/5 of 
their  total  endowment,  a  ‘high  obligation  condition’  (‘H  condition’),  where  the  minimum 
contribution  required  corresponds  to  4/5  of  an  individual’s  total  endowment.  As  we  are 
interested in the effects of obligations per se, we keep as fixed across all treatments the level of 
marginal incentives, i.e. the probability to be audited and the penalty/reward rate.    7 
In the instructions we stress that the obligation fixes a minimum contribution required to each 
individual,  but  that  the  feasible  contribution  for  each  participant  varies  between  0  and  her 
overall  endowment.  Moreover  we  explain  in  detail  the  consequences  of  each  choice  on 
individual payoffs.  
The parameters of the game are set as follows. The initial endowment is 20 = y , the number of 
subjects per group is  6 = n , the marginal per capita return to the public good is  3 . 0 = m , the 
probability of control is  12 / 1 = p , the sanction/reward rate is equal to  2 . 1 = g  (this ensures 
that:  n m / 1 >   and  1 < + pg m ),  the  minimum  contributions  fixed  by  obligation  are 
respectively  4 ˆ = a  in the ‘L condition’ and  16 ˆ = a  in the ‘H condition’. 
The  experiment  was  conducted  in  a  computerized  laboratory  where  subjects  anonymously 
interacted  with  each  other
8.  No  subject  is  ever  informed  about  the  identity  of  other  group 
members. We conducted three sections, one for each treatment. In each session participants are 
divided into 6 groups of size 6 for a total number of 108 subjects. Subjects were undergraduate 
students of different faculties, each subject participated to one session only and nobody had 
previously  participated  in  other  public  goods  experiments  before.  The  experiment  was 
conducted in the experimental laboratory of the University of Siena (Italy). Each session lasted 
about one hour and the average earning for each subject had been of 14 euros (about 17 US 
dollars). 
  
2.3. Behavioural predictions 
If we assume common knowledge of rationality, risk neutrality and selfishness of all players, we 
expect that in every treatment the unconditional contribution of each subject is equal to zero and 
that conditional contribution entries are all zero for each subject. Indeed, consider in our setting 
the  optimal  choice  of  a  risk-neutral  and  fully  self-interested  individual.  Her  optimal 
contribution, 
*
i a , is the value of  i a  which maximizes (1). The first order condition of the 
maximization problem yields: 







i                         (2) 
Hence the dominant strategy for a (risk-neutral) self-interested individual is always the full free-
riding:  0
* = i a . This result depends crucially on the assumption that  1 < + pg m , meaning that 
the monetary incentives are not sufficiently high to make the expected return from one unit of 
contribution higher than one unit kept for herself. Notice that the level of minimum contribution 
a ˆ  required by obligation does not affect the optimal choice of a self-interested individual. This 
                                                 
8 For conducting the experiment we used the experimental software ‘z-Tree’ developed by Fischbacher 
(1999).   8 
is straightforward since obligations do not affect marginal monetary payoffs. In order to satisfy 
this condition, our setting presents both a probabilistic penalty for those we contribute less than 
the minimum contribution and a probabilistic reward for those who contribute more. Notice that 
considering instead only a probabilistic penalty (reward) for the individuals who contribute less 
(more)  than  a ˆ ,  we  would  obtain  two  distinct  first-order  conditions  for  the  maximization 
problem, one for the interval  a ai ˆ ≤  and the other one for the interval  a ai ˆ > . But in this case 
different levels of a ˆ would imply different marginal monetary payoffs, that instead we want to 
keep fixed in order to isolate the effect of different obligations. 
Nevertheless,  a  huge  amount  of  empirical  and  experimental  literature  shows  that  in  social 
dilemmas  many  individuals  are  characterized  by  social  preferences,  i.e.  other  regarding  or 
process regarding preferences (for a survey on social preferences see Camerer and Fehr, 2002; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 2002). In particular there is evidence that a considerable share of individuals 
act as conditional cooperators, i.e. they are willing to cooperate (despite monetary incentives to 
free-ride)  if  the  other  members  of  their  group  cooperate  to  a  sufficient  extent.  Moreover, 
individuals may internalize norms of cooperation and may suffer emotional consequences when 
they  contribute  less  than  the  internalized  level  (Bowles  and  Gintis,  2003).  When  social 
preferences  are  taken  into  account,  obligations  may  affect  people  beliefs  about  others’ 
contributions and people’s preference for cooperation.  
If obligations affect beliefs, we expect to observe significant differences in declared beliefs 
about others’ contributions across treatments. If obligations affect preferences, we expect to find 
significant  differences  in  the  conditional  contribution  schedules.  Indeed,  if  people  make 
different contribution for the same hypothetical average contributions of other group members, 
this means that preferences for cooperation are directly shaped by obligations. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Unconditional cooperation 
The first step of our analysis is to understand whether or not obligations affect unconditional 
contributions. In figure 1 we report average unconditional contributions in the three treatments, 
characterised  by  three  different  levels  of  minimum  contribution  required  by  obligation 
(respectively  0,  4  and  16  tokens).  As  one  can  notice,  the  treatment  where  the  minimum 
contribution  required  is  4  tokens  (‘L  condition’)  and  the  treatment  where  no  minimum 
contribution is required (‘0 condition’) present similar levels of average contribution to the 
public  good  (respectively  9.36  and  8.30  tokens).  Instead,  the  average  contribution  in  the 
treatment where the minimum contribution required is equal to 16 tokens (‘H condition’) is 
remarkably higher (15.05 tokens) than in the two other treatments.  
A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test
9 is applied in order to test the statistical significance of the 
differences in contribution levels between treatments
10. Results are reported in Table 4. Mean 
                                                 
9 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the group average contribution.    9 
contributions  under  the  ‘H  condition’  are  higher  at  significant  statistical  levels  than  mean 
contributions in both other treatments. Instead, we do not find a significant difference between 



















































MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  z=-0.321; p=0.7483  z=-2.887; p=0.004 
MC=4    z=-2.402; p=0.016 
 
These  results  confirm  the  findings  obtained  by  Galbiati  and  Vertova  (2005)  in  a  dynamic 
setting: for given marginal incentives, obligations can affect the average propensity to cooperate 
to a public good. In particular, when the minimum contribution required is sufficiently high (‘H 
condition’), the level of cooperation is significantly higher than in presence of low or null 
obligation.  Instead,  when  the  minimum  contribution  required  by  obligation  is  low  (‘L 
condition’),  there  is  not  a  significant  difference  with  respect  to  the  no  obligation  case.  A 
straightforward  interpretation  of  this  last  result  is  that,  with  low  obligation,  conditional 
conditional co-operators find confirmation (on average) of their preferences and beliefs when no 
obligation exists
11. Figure 2 reports the frequencies of contributions in the three samples. The 
distribution of individual contributions under the ‘L condition’ is not very different from the 
distribution of individual contributions under the ‘0 condition’, even if in this last case the 
                                                                                                                                               
10 We report both the values of the test (z) and the p-values (p). 
11 Indeed in one-shot public good games with no obligations, average contributions tend to be around 40-
50% of the overall endowment because of the behaviour of conditional co-operators.   10 
distribution is more concentrated towards an intermediate value (around 8 tokens). Instead the 
distribution  of  contributions  under  the  ‘H  condition’  is  very  different,  being  more  shifted 
towards  right,  with  individual  contributions  concentrated  around  the  level  of  16-18  tokens. 
Figure  2  suggests that,  in  presence of  a higher level  of  minimum  contribution  required  by 
obligation, conditional co-operators tend to cooperate more.  
The previous evidence can be summarized as follows:  
Result 1. Obligations affect the levels of average contributions to a one-shot public good. In 
particular  average  contributions  are  significantly  higher  when  the  minimum  contribution 





































































































































Our next step is to study how obligations affect beliefs about others’ contributions. Figure 3 
shows, for the three treatments, the average beliefs about average unconditional contributions in 
the group. One can notice how the average beliefs are similar under the ‘0 condition’ and the ‘L 
condition’  (respectively  9.44  and  8.69  tokens),  whereas  under  the  ‘H  condition’  they  are 
definitely higher (14.67). The results of the Mann-Whitney test
12 reported in Tables 5 show that 
the previous descriptive comparison has a statistical significance. This means that obligations 
affect  the  expectations  about  others’  contributions.  In  particular,  when  the  minimum 
contribution set up by obligation is sufficiently high, individuals expect other group members 
will contribute more.  
This highlights that obligations anchored beliefs: indeed beliefs are coordinated towards higher 
(or lower) levels of expected co-operation when the level of minimum contribution required by 
obligation is higher (lower). Therefore, when the level of minimum contribution is sufficiently 
high, conditional co-operators, i.e. those people who want to cooperate when they expect others 
contribute to a sufficient extent, will cooperate more to the public good because of the effects of 
obligations on their beliefs. Result 2 summarizes evidence on beliefs. 
 
Result 2. Obligations affect the average beliefs about others’ unconditional contributions. In 
particular  average  beliefs  are  significantly  higher  under  the  condition  where  the  minimum 




                                                 
12 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the group average contribution.   12 
FIGURE 3 
BELIEFS ABOUT OTHERS’ UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION 















































MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON BELIEFS 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  Z=0.485; p=0.679  z=-2.882; p=0.004 
MC=4    z=-2.732; p=0.016 
 
 
3.3. Conditional cooperation 
We now analyze the patterns of conditional contributions under the different conditions. On 
average across the 21 choices (where each choice corresponds to each hypothetical average 
contribution in the group from 0 to 20), conditional contributions are different in the three 
treatments (see figure 4). In particular, average conditional contributions correspond to 7.81 
tokens in the ‘0 condition’, 10.31 tokens in the ‘L condition’ and 12.62 in the ‘H condition’. A 
Mann-Whitney  test
13  is  applied  in  order  to  measure  the  significance  of  the  differences  in 
average  conditional  contributions  between  each  pair  of  treatments.  Table  6  reports  the 
corresponding results: for all comparisons (respectively between ‘0’ and ‘L’, ‘L’ and ‘H’ and 
‘0’  and  ‘H’),  average  conditional  contributions  are  significantly  higher  when  the  minimum 
contribution required by obligation is higher. 
 
FIGURE 4 
                                                 
13 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the group average contribution.   13 
CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 















































MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  z=-2.242; p=0.025  z=-2.882; p=0.004 
MC=4    z=-2.242; p=0.025 
 
 
Figure 5 reports the patterns of conditional contributions under the three different conditions. 
The curves corresponding respectively to the ‘H condition’ and the ‘0 condition’ strongly differ 
on the entire interval between 0 and 20. In particular the conditional contribution schedule 
corresponding  to  the  ‘H  condition’  is  definitely  above  the  one  corresponding  to  the  ‘0 
condition’. The curve corresponding to the ‘L condition’ differs from the two other curves: the 
difference with respect to the ‘0 condition’ curve is particularly marked in correspondence to 
high levels of others’ hypothetical average contributions, whereas the difference with respect to 
the ‘H condition’ is more relevant for low levels of others’ hypothetical average contributions. 
The differences among the conditional contributions schedules highlight that, even if we control 
for beliefs about others’ contributions by the means of the strategy method, average cooperation 
results to be triggered by the level of minimum contribution required by obligation. This means 
that on average the preference structure is shaped by the obligation imposed in the treatment. In 
particular a stronger obligation entails a stronger preference for cooperation.  
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FIGURE 5 
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In order to better interpret the conditional contributions schedules, it is worth analyzing the 
behaviour of conditional co-operators. In order to do that, for each treatment we extract from the 
overall  sample  the  sub-sample  of  conditional  co-operators,  i.e.  those  individuals  whose 
contributions are increasing and monotonic. In particular, following Fischbacher et al. (2001), 
we select as ‘conditional co-operators’ all the subjects having a positive and highly significant 
(p-value<0,001) Spearman rank correlation coefficient (between own and others’ contribution). 
These sub-samples are composed 17, 29 and 23 conditional co-operators respectively for the ‘0 
condition’,  ‘L  condition’  and  ‘H  condition’  treatment.  Figure  6  shows  how  average 
unconditional contributions for theses sub-samples are very similar to the ones emerging from 
the  overall  samples  (compare  with  figure  1).  Using  the  Mann-Whitney  test
14  to  compare 
unconditional contributions, we find similar results to the overall samples: there is a significant 
difference  in  average  unconditional  contributions  between  the  ‘0  condition’  and  the  ‘H 
condition’  and  between  the  ‘L  condition’  and  the  ‘H  condition’,  whereas  there  is  not  a 
significant difference between the ‘0 condition’ and the ‘L condition’. Figure 10 and Table 9 
show how average beliefs for these sub-samples of individuals are very similar with respect to 
the overall samples. Figure 7 reports the conditional contribution schedules for the sub-samples 
of  conditional  co-operators  in  the three  treatments  (whereas  in  Figure  8  we  report  average 
                                                 
14 Since the groups are dismembered, in this case the unit of observation in the statistical test is the 
individual average contribution. For this reason the level of significance of the coefficients are different 
with respect to the overall sample case.   15 
conditional  contributions  across  the  21  choices).  As  one  can  see,  they  correspond  to  three 
parallel, increasing and monotonic curves. The results of the Mann-Whitney test
15 (Table 8) 
show that these differences are statistically significant. This last result is particularly interesting: 
obligations shape the preference structure of conditional co-operators. Conditional co-operators 
are willing to cooperate more when a higher minimum contribution is required by obligation. In 
other terms, obligations can affect the mechanism which is on the basis of cooperation in social 
dilemmas, i.e. reciprocation among those individuals that are inclined to cooperate as long as 
the  others  cooperate  as  well  to  a  sufficient  extent. Indeed,  given  a  certain  level  of  others’ 
average cooperation, a higher minimum contribution required by obligation entails on average 
higher contributions of conditional co-operators. In conclusion our main result is the following.  
Result  3.  Conditional  contribution  schedules  are  significantly  different  across  the  different 




UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
(CONDITIONAL COOPERATORS ONLY) 














































MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
(CONDITIONAL COOPERATORS ONLY) 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  z=-0.263; p=0.7483  z=-4.068; p=0.000 
MC=4    z=-4.727; p=0.000 
 
                                                 
15 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the individual average contribution.   16 
FIGURE 7 
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MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
(CONDITIONAL COOPERATORS ONLY) 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  z=-1.878; p=0.060  z=-3.297; p=0.001 
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FIGURE 10 
BELIEFS ABOUT OTHERS’ UNCONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION 














































MANN-WHITNEY TEST ON BELIEFS 
(CONDITIONAL COOPERATORS ONLY) 
Treatment Conditions  MC=4  MC=16 
MC=0  Z=0.526; p=0.599  z=-3.705; p=0.000 
MC=4    z=-4.830; p=0.000 
 
4. Comments and concluding Remarks 
Understanding  how  formal  rules  (i.e.  “obligations  backed  by  incentives”)  affect  human 
behaviour  represents  a  fundamental  task  for  economic  theory  and  for  policy  makers.  The 
economic  literature  has  largely  studied  the  role  of  material  incentives  in  shaping  people’s 
choices. Yet, the effects of obligations (i.e. what rules ask people to do or not to do) on human 
behaviour is still a black box. The traditional assumption of self-interested individuals explains 
why obligations represent the “hidden side of rules”. Indeed, since obligations per se do not 
affect material payoffs, self-interested people are completely neutral to them. However, a huge 
experimental  literature  has  shown  how  people’s  preferences  depart  from  mere  self-interest: 
social preferences matter. This is a new starting point to study the impact of obligations on 
human behaviour. In this paper we analyze the independent effect of obligations on individuals’ 
reasons of behaviour in a public good game. Our results, in line with Falk et al. (forthcoming) 
on the behavioural effects of minimum wage, show that obligations per se (for given marginal 
incentives) can affect people’s behaviour. In particular, we find that he propensity to cooperate 
to the public good is significantly higher when the minimum contribution required by obligation 
is  sufficiently  high.  Furthermore,  through  a  strategy  based  on  the  elicitation  of  beliefs  and   18 
conditional contributions to the public good, we find that the effect of obligations on behaviour 
depends not only on the fact that beliefs about others’ contributions are anchored to obligations, 
but also on the direct impact of obligations on social preferences.  
These results add to the literature concerning the effects of institutions (i.e. the formal rules of 
the game) on human behaviour. They complement the literature on the behavioural effects of 
incentives  by  showing  that  also  the  obligations  (“the  hidden  sides  of  rules”)  entail  some 
behavioural effect  on  individual  choices.  Furthermore,  our  research is  able to  highlight  the 
channels through which formal rules influence the individual willingness to cooperate. This 
aspect  of  the  research  is  particularly  important.  Indeed,  recent  contributions  analyze  how 
changes in rules (e.g. in the structure of the incentives) affect individual behaviour even in an 
unexpected way (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000); nonetheless, very little is known (at least 
empirically) about the channels of transmission by which rules exert their effects, that is to say 
about the effects that rules exert on people’s motives of behaviour. Our investigation shows that 
rules  can  affect  both  beliefs  about  others’  behaviour  and  preferences.  This  is  particularly 
interesting as it shows how institutions are able to influence the very determinants of people’s 
choices. Furthermore, it remarks the importance of further research in this field. In particular, as 
we often observe that similar rules have different impacts in presence of different cultures and 
as customary beliefs and values are the roots of cultural differences (Guiso et al. 2006), it would 
be very interesting to extend our research in order to understand how rules impact on people’s 
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Appendix 1: Controlling for differences in risk preferences 
In order to control for the possible effect of risk preferences, at the end of the public good 
experiment we run a lottery to single out subjects’ risk preferences. This lottery is similar to that 
implemented by Holt and Laury (2001). The experimental test is based on five choices between 
the paired lotteries reported in Table A1.  
 
TABLE A1 
PAIRED LOTTERY CHOICES 
 
Option A Option B Payoff Differences (A-B)
1/10 100 tokens; 9/10 80 tokens 1/10 170 tokens; 9/10 10 tokens 56
3/10 100 tokens; 7/10 80 tokens 3/10 170 tokens; 7/10 10 tokens 28
5/10 100 tokens; 5/10 80 tokens 5/10 170 tokens; 5/10 10 tokens 0
7/10 100 tokens; 3/10 80 tokens 7/10 170 tokens; 3/10 10 tokens -28
9/10 100 tokens; 1/10 80 tokens 9/10 170 tokens; 1/10 10 tokens -56  
 
In each paired lottery, subjects choose between an alternative A and an alternative B. Once all 
subjects have taken their choice, a pair of lotteries is randomly chosen and the computer assigns 
to  each  subject  the  option  (A  or  B)  she  has  chosen.  Finally  the  lottery  is  run  in  order  to 
determine each subject’s payoff. Following the method proposed by Holt and Laury (2001), we   21 




RISK PREFERENCES ASSOCIATED TO LOTTERY CHOICES 
 
Sequence of Choices Risk type
A-A-A-A-A highly risk averse
A-A-A-A-B risk averse
A-A-A-B-B or A-A-B-B-B risk neutral
A-B-B-B-B risk lover
B-B-B-B-B highly risk lover
Other Sequences inconsistent coiches  
 
In table A3 we report the frequencies of subjects by classes of risk preferences as obtained by 
running the experiment described in paragraph 2.3.  
 
TABLE A3 
FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS BY CLASSES OF RISK PREFERENCES 
Classes of risk preferences  Session 1 (MC=0)  Session 2 (MC=4)  Session 3 (MC=16) 
Highly risk averse  6  1  2 
Risk averse  5  3  6 
Risk neutral  14  23  16 
Risk lover  1  2  0 
Highly risk lover  1  1  1 
Inconsistent choices  9  6  11 
 
It is worth noting that the frequencies are similar across the different samples. Furthermore, we 
notice that the number of risk-lover or highly risk-lover individuals is very small. 
In  order  to  test  whether  or  not  differences  in  risk  preferences  are  relevant  in  explaining 
differences in contributions, we have subdivided our sample into three groups: the first group is 
composed of risk-neutral individuals, the second composed of risk-adverse individuals and the 
third  one is  composed  of highly  risk-adverse  individuals
16.  Moreover  we compute for  each 
subject  an  index  given  by  the  difference  between  her  unconditional  contribution  and  the 
minimum contribution required in her treatment. Then we apply a Mann-Whitney rank-sum 
test
17 of the difference in this index between each pair of groups. The Mann-Whitney rank-sum 
test of the difference in this index between risk neutral and highly risk adverse individuals 
yields z = -1.295, which is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The same test 
                                                 
16 We have not considered risk-lover or highly risk-lover individuals, who represent a negligible fraction 
of subjects in the sample, nor individuals whose choices are inconsistent.  
17 The unit of observation in the statistical test is the individual.   22 
applied to the difference in this index between risk neutral and risk adverse individuals yields z 
= -0.627, which is certainly not statistically significant. Finally, the difference between highly 
risk adverse and risk adverse individuals is also found not statistically significant (z = -0.539). 
Hence, differences in subjects’ risk preferences across the different samples do not affect our 
results for two reasons. First, the distribution of subjects by class of risk preferences is very 
similar in the different sessions. Second, there is not any significant difference in individual 
behaviours with respect to the minimum contribution between highly risk adverse, risk-adverse 
and risk-neutral individuals. This last result can be explained by the fact that the probability to 
be audited in each round and the penalty rate are very low. 
 